DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

DP19775

CORRUPTION EXPOSURE, POLITICAL TRUST, AND IMMIGRANTS

Cevat Giray Aksoy, Barry Eichengreen, Anastasia Litina, Cem Ozguzel and Chan Yu

DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS

CEPR

ISSN 0265-8003

CORRUPTION EXPOSURE, POLITICAL TRUST, AND IMMIGRANTS

Cevat Giray Aksoy, Barry Eichengreen, Anastasia Litina, Cem Ozguzel and Chan Yu

Discussion Paper DP19775
Published 16 December 2024
Submitted 16 December 2024

Centre for Economic Policy Research
33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK
187 boulevard Saint-Germain, 75007 Paris, France
Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801
www.cepr.org

CORRUPTION EXPOSURE, POLITICAL TRUST, AND IMMIGRANTS

Abstract

Scholars and politicians have expressed concern that immigrants from countries with low levels of political trust transfer those attitudes to their destination countries. Using large-scale survey data covering 38 countries and exploiting origin-country variation across different cohorts and survey rounds, we show that, to the contrary, immigrants more exposed to institutional corruption before migrating exhibit higher levels of political trust in their new country. Higher trust is observed for national political institutions only and does not carry over to other supra-national institutions and individuals. We report evidence that higher levels of political trust among immigrants persist, leading to greater electoral participation and political engagement in the long run. The impact of home-country corruption on political trust in the destination country is further amplified by large differences in levels of income and democracy between home and host countries, which serve to highlight the contrast in the two settings. It is lessened by exposure to media, a source of information about institutional quality. Finally, our extensive analyses indicate that self-selection into host countries based on trust is highly unlikely and the results hold even when focusing only on forced migrants who were unlikely to have been subject to selection.

JEL Classification: Z1, D73

Keywords: Corruption, Institutions, Immigrants

Cevat Giray Aksoy - cevat.aksoy@kcl.ac.uk
EBRD, King's College London, and CEPR

Barry Eichengreen - eichengr@econ.berkeley.edu
University of California, Berkeley and CEPR

Anastasia Litina - anastasia.litina@uom.edu.gr
University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki

Cem Ozguzel - cemozguzel@gmail.com
Sorbonne Economics Center

Chan Yu - chanyu@uibe.edu.cn
University of International Business and Economics

Corruption Exposure, Political Trust, and Immigrants*

Cevat Giray Aksoy, Barry Eichengreen, Anastasia Litina, Cem Özgüzel and Chan Yu

Abstract

Scholars and politicians have expressed concern that immigrants from countries with low levels of political trust transfer those attitudes to their destination countries. Using large-scale survey data covering 38 countries and exploiting origin-country variation across different cohorts and survey rounds, we show that, to the contrary, immigrants more exposed to institutional corruption before migrating exhibit *higher* levels of political trust in their new country. Higher trust is observed for national political institutions only and does not carry over to other supra-national institutions and individuals. We report evidence that higher levels of political trust among immigrants persist, leading to greater electoral participation and political engagement in the long run. The impact of home-country corruption on political trust in the destination country is further amplified by large differences in levels of income and democracy between home and host countries, which serve to highlight the contrast in the two settings. It is lessened by exposure to media, a source of information about institutional quality. Finally, our extensive analyses indicate that self-selection into host countries based on trust is highly unlikely and the results hold even when focusing only on forced migrants who were unlikely to have been subject to selection.

Keywords: Corruption, Institutions, Immigrants, Political Trust
JEL Classification Numbers: Z1, D73

*We thank Ralph De Haas, Anthony Edo, Davide Furceri, Oded Galor, Thomas Piketty, Hillel Rapoport, Andreas Steinmayr, Jérôme Valette, Pierre-Louis Vézina, Fabrizio Zilibotti, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya and seminar participants at Autonomous University of Barcelona, Bocconi University, CEPII, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Deakin University, Hamburg Lectures in Law and Economics, London School of Economics, Newcastle University, Paris Dauphine University, Paris School of Economics, Stanford University, University of Luxembourg, University of Oxford, University of St. Andrews and conference participants at the AASLE Conference, European Journal of Political Economy Conference, 11th Conference on Immigration in OECD Countries, and 1st Istanbul Applied Micro Workshop. Aksoy is Senior Economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Associate Professor of Economics at King's College London, Research Associate at Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and IZA Institute of Labour Economics. Eichengreen is Pardee Chair and Distinguished Professor of Economics and Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and Research Fellow at the CEPR. Litina is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki and Research Fellow at the University of Luxembourg. Özgüzel is a Research Associate at the Paris School of Economics, Sorbonne Economics Center and IZA Institute of Labour Economics. Yu is Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of International Business and Economics. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EBRD. All errors are our own. The authors have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research in this paper.

1. Introduction

Political trust, defined as the trust that individuals place in political institutions, matters importantly for political participation and societal outcomes. As John Locke famously argued in *the Second Treatise of Civil Government*, trust of citizens in their government is essential for an open society governed by rule of law. When people distrust political institutions, they may view public policies and processes as illegitimate and resort to irregular methods, including violent protests and demonstrations, to achieve political ends (Easton, 1965; Papaioannou, 2013). To take a topical example from the United States, if people distrust the authorities responsible for counting ballots, they may disregard election results and organize protests that threaten the peaceful transition of power. More generally, evidence shows that political trust matters for the effectiveness of a wide variety public policies and outcomes such as, for example, compliance with public health advisories and regulatory rules (Levi and Stoker, 2000; Bargain and Aminjonov, 2020).

Societies with high levels of immigration thus face a challenge centered around immigrants' political trust and participation. The trust that immigrants have in the institutions of their host country can significantly impact their engagement and integration into civic and political life. Without trust in political institutions, immigrants may feel marginalized and disconnected from the broader society, which can lead to social tensions and other negative consequences (see e.g., Easton and Dennis, 1967; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022).

Moreover, some observers argue that immigrants from countries with widespread distrust of government may bring this scepticism with them. This reflects a broader concern that immigrants from source countries with weak institutions could potentially weaken the functioning of institutions in their host countries. Thus, Borjas (2014, p.169) writes, “For immigration to generate substantial global gains, it must be the case that billions of immigrants can move to the industrialized economies without importing the ‘bad’ institutions that led to poor economic

conditions in the course countries in the first place." Clemens and Pritchett (2019, p.154) point to the possibility that "low productivity spreads from poor countries to rich countries via cultures and institutions carried by migrants…" Nowrasteh and Powell (2020, p.30) summarize the so-called new economic case for immigration restrictions as positing that "immigrants can transmit the traits responsible for low productivity in their old countries of origin to their new destination countries and thus lower productivity there." Specifically, they raise the possibility that "origin-country corruption might migrate with immigrants" because beliefs about corruption are deeply ingrained in long-standing cultural norms and beliefs: "Thus, as the immigrants move, these beliefs and norms move with them."[2] Populist, anti-immigrant politicians have echoed these concerns, often using more direct and less politically sensitive language.

Although these concerns have a long history, they have not been examined systematically. In this paper, we therefore study whether immigrants who encountered poor institutions prior to migrating exhibit more or less trust in the institutions of their host country. Specifically, we test whether immigrants who were exposed to more corruption in their native country vest greater trust in the parliaments, political parties, and politicians of their country of destination.

We use data from eight waves of the European Social Survey spanning the period 2004-2018, conducted in 38 European countries, to measure the political trust among immigrants. We then measure immigrants' exposure to corruption in their home-country using Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) data. Our empirical strategy exploits within-origin country, within-host country, between-age cohort variation. Put simply, we compare immigrants with similar observable characteristics, coming from the same origin country, residing in the same host country, but exposed to different levels of origin-country corruption before migration. We achieve this by controlling for

[2] Nowrasteh and Powell (2020), p.99. The authors themselves are agnostic about the hypothesis; as they go on to write, "there are also strong reasons to doubt that corruption migrates with immigrants."

pair (origin-host), origin country by year, host country by year, and age cohort fixed effects.

We find that immigrants' exposure to corruption in their native country is an important determinant of the trust they place in parliaments, political parties and politicians of their country of immigration. Strikingly, exposure to more corruption in the native country affects trust in the political institutions of the host country *positively*, not negatively. Moreover, it is not exposure in general that matters, but rather exposure in early adulthood, i.e., at ages 18-25.[3] We find that a one standard deviation increase in immigrants' corruption exposure increases their average political trust in host institutions by approximately 0.044 standard deviations in the level of trust. Importantly, the higher levels of political trust associated with this pre-immigration experience have concrete behavioural implications. More political trust in the host country leads to more political action: immigrants more exposed to corruption in their country of origin are more likely to be interested in politics, to have voted in the last election, and to work in a political party or political action group. Not only survey responses reflecting attitudes but also actual behavior is affected.

We address concerns over robustness through five distinct and complementary ways. First, we show that our results are not driven by other past economic, social and political shocks that individuals experienced in early adulthood. Second, we show that the results are robust to controlling for country-by-age, subnational-region-by-age-cohort or age-of-arrival fixed effects, migrant networks, and household income. Third, results hold across a variety of specification checks (using alternative indices for measuring corruption, excluding potential bad controls, conducting multiple hypothesis tests, ruling out influential observations, focusing only on a subsample of immigrants coming from countries with corruption levels that are lower than their host countries, and using alternative sampling weights). Fourth, we document that corruption in the

[3] The early adulthood (i.e., impressionable years) hypothesis traces back to Newcomb (1943) and Newcomb, Koenig, Flacks and Warwick (1967).

origin country in the period before an immigrant is born has no impact on their political trust in the destination country; this finding mitigates concerns about our results being driven by broad social changes affecting political trust. Fifth, we show that when we associate first-generation immigrants not with the institutional quality of their origin country but instead with the institutional quality of the host country, we do not find significant effects.

These results are also unlikely to be explained by self-selection into destination based on political trust for several reasons. Our empirical strategy compares only immigrants moving from the same origin to the same destination while also controlling for observable characteristics and age cohort fixed effects. By introducing origin-destination pair fixed effects, we control for time-invariant factors specific to each origin-destination pair. This means that differences between immigrants in terms of pre-migration corruption exposure are analysed within the context of each specific origin-destination pair. Any characteristic that makes individuals more likely to migrate from a particular origin to a particular destination will be accounted for in this fixed effect. Moreover, by focusing on relative differences in corruption exposure among immigrants from the same origin country who all migrate to the same host country, our approach compares only those who have already made the decision to migrate. This within-group comparison can mitigate selection bias because it does not compare migrants to non-migrants, but rather to other migrants who may share many similar selection factors (like the decision to emigrate from the same origin country).

The results are also not driven by the fact that more trusting people tend to emigrate. If immigrants are more trusting by nature, then they should exhibit greater trust not only in their host-country political institutions but also in other institutions and individuals. This is not the case (in particular, we find no effects on other outcomes such as social trust and trust in supra-national organizations); the positive effects are limited to political institutions. Balance tests show that

individual-level past corruption exposure and the socio-demographic characteristics of immigrants are not correlated with host country characteristics (e.g., GDP, population, exports, physicians per capita, etc.). Finally, the results also hold when focusing only on migrants originating from countries affected by wars, who are forcibly displaced and thus unlikely to be subject to selection.

Our findings also reveal notable differences between natives and immigrants. Specifically, natives who were more exposed to corruption in their formative years exhibit lower, not higher, levels of political trust. The magnitude of the impact, if not also its sign, is comparable for natives and immigrants, underscoring the contrasting attitudes observed for these two groups.

In the final section of the paper, we investigate whether individuals assess outcomes in relation to a reference point established by previous experience. Specifically, we examine whether immigrants hold more positive views of the political institutions of their host country when they compare favourably to those in their country of origin where their attitudes and expectations regarding political institutions were presumably formed. Our findings suggest that migrants, when faced with large differences in income and democratic practices between the countries of origin and destination, tend to place greater trust in the political institutions of the host country. This higher political trust in the host country can be plausibly attributed to experience with improved living conditions. We also observe that migrants from less democratic countries exhibit higher levels of political trust.

In contrast, the impact of past exposure to corruption on political trust is less pronounced among immigrants with more exposure to media in their host country. An interpretation is that by following local media immigrants expand their understanding of institutions of their host country, which attenuates the positive effect of home-country corruption.

2. Related Literature and Our Contribution

Our paper contributes to several literatures. First is the recent literature on the determinants of political trust, particularly the role of early life events.[4] Guiso, Herrera, Morelli, and Sonno (2024) analyze how negative economic shocks early in life negatively affect political trust. Acemoglu, Ajzenman, Aksoy, Fiszbein, and Molina (2024) show that greater exposure to democracy leads to more trust in democratic institutions. Eichengreen, Saka, and Aksoy (2024) find that epidemic exposure early in life has a persistent negative effect on trust in political institutions and leaders.[5] Daniele, Aassve, and Le Moglie (2023) find that young first-time voters exposed to the large-scale corruption scandal in Italy in the early 1990s exhibit significantly less institutional trust and were more likely to support populist parties in 2018 national elections. Our results are similar in highlighting the importance of past experience, but they differ in the sign of the effect. Specifically, more exposure to low-quality, corrupt institutions in an immigrant's country of origin has a *positive* effect on the trust that they vest in the political institutions of the country of immigration.[6]

Second there is literature on the persistence of family and economic outcomes in the context of immigration – that is, how home-country norms, practices and institutions shape expectations and behaviour in the host country. This literature finds persistence in fertility outcomes (Fernández and Fogli, 2009), labour force participation (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010), and preferences for redistribution (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011). While contributing to this literature, our results also differ sharply from these earlier studies. In contrast to result in these earlier papers, we find that

[4] There is also an extensive literature on interpersonal trust (see, e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006).
[5] Eichengreen, Aksoy and Saka (2021) also examine how exposure to epidemics during the impressionable years (ages 18–25) affects trust in science and scientists, using data from a 2018 global survey and epidemic records since 1970. The findings reveal that while such exposure does not alter views on science itself, it significantly reduces trust in scientists and their work, particularly among individuals with limited science education, leading to lower compliance with health policies like vaccination.
[6] Our paper is on the determinants of political trust, not on perceptions of corruption, but it is related to the perceptions-of-corruption literature insofar as a measure of corruption is our key independent variable (Olken, 2009; Gutmann, Padovano and Voigt, 2019).

low trust in the political institutions of the country of original results in unusually *high* trust in the political institutions of the country of immigration. Thus, our contribution is not only to document the persistence of an effect but to identify a novel mechanism through which individuals update, as opposed to simply retaining, their beliefs.

Third is literature on how institutions shape individual behaviour. For example, Shiller, Boycko, Korobov, Winter, and Schelling (1992) and Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007) explore the effect of exposure to the institutions of socialism on entrepreneurship, leadership, and attitudes towards redistribution and state intervention. Fisman and Miguel (2007) examine the impact of exposure to corrupt institutions on subsequent corruption norms.[7] We show that exposure to corrupt institutions similarly affects trust in political institutions, albeit in a different fashion than would be expected on the basis of this literature. Our paper also presents causal cross-country evidence on this question by drawing on data from a larger number and a more varied sample of countries, which allows greater confidence in the generality of the findings.

Fourth, we contribute to the literature on voter turnout. Existing research has demonstrated that citizens may be discouraged from participating in the electoral process by their perceptions of corruption (Chong, De La O, Karlan, and Wantchekon, 2015; Sundström and Stockemer, 2015). In contrast to these studies, we present evidence that immigrants exposed to corruption in their country of origin are *more* likely to be interested in politics and to *more* likely have voted in the last election in the host country.

Finally, our paper contributes to the debate on economic case for immigration restrictions.[8] Advocates of such restrictions argue that international migrants have the potential to transfer factors

[7] Analysing variations in the number of unpaid parking tickets among foreign diplomats at the United Nations, they show that diplomats coming from countries with weaker institutions tend to break the rules more frequently and are less likely to pay fines.

[8] See, Nowrasteh and Powell (2020) for comprehensive empirical assessment of the new economic case for immigration restrictions.

responsible for low productivity in their countries of origin to wealthier destination countries (see, Clemens and Pritchett, 2019 for a detailed discussion). Collier (2013) and Borjas (2015) argue that immigrants introduce low-quality norms prevalent in their countries of origin, thereby generating a negative externality that affects both formal and informal institutions within the destination countries. Our findings present a contrasting perspective. They do not support the notion that immigration from poor countries with weak norms and institutions undermines prevailing norms in destination countries in the case political trust and participation.

3. Data and Variables

Our data on trust in institutions come from Waves 2-9 (2004-2018) of the European Social Survey (ESS).[9] These surveys are fielded every two years in 38 European countries.[10] Interviews are conducted in local languages. Our main sample includes 31,797 migrants aged 15 years and older from 196 countries.

We consider three measures of trust in political institutions: "Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust: (i) parliament; (ii) politicians; (iii) political parties."[11] We consider these measures individually and combine them into a single index by taking the average of three outcomes. We exclude observations with missing responses for political trust in the ESS survey data.[12] To test whether the effects are specific to political trust, we also examine answers about other dimensions of trust, such as social trust, trust in non-national institutions (such as the United Nations), or non-political attitudes (such as views of homosexuality and fairness).

[9] We drop the first round of the survey because it does not include information of country of origin of migrants.
[10] The sample is an unbalanced panel because not all countries were surveyed in every round.
[11] The actual question queried also about trust in the legal system. Since the legal system is not a political institution per se, we do not consider it here.
[12] In our sample, fewer than 10% observations are with missing values in political trust variables in the ESS data.

This allows us to examine whether our results are specific to political institutions.

Our variable of interest is corruption exposure in the respondent's home country between the ages of 18 to 25. To investigate the role of early adulthood exposure compared to exposure in other age ranges, we also calculate corruption exposure in ages 0-9, 10-17, 26-33, and 34+. We measure corruption using Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) data covering 202 countries from 1900 to 2018.[13] V-DEM provides an executive and public sector corruption index, a judicial corruption index, and a legislative corruption index.[14]

Executive and public sector corruption measure how routinely public-sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks or other material inducements and how often they steal, embezzle or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use. Legislative corruption indicates how often members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain by receiving bribes, obtaining government contracts for firms that legislators own, doing favours for firms in order to obtain the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, or stealing money from the state or campaign donations. Judicial corruption captures how often individuals or businesses make undocumented payments or bribes to obtain favorable judicial decisions.[15]

In our baseline analysis, we use an average of executive corruption, judicial corruption, legislative corruption, and public-sector corruption. Values range from 0 to 1, with higher values

[13] The V-DEM dataset includes information from the years 1789 to 2020. Since our earliest cohorts were born in 1900, we use 1900 as the starting point for our main sample. For more detail see https://www.v-dem.net/en/news/political-corruption-persistent-global-phenomenon/

[14] Each index is based on factual and evaluative indicators. The former use data from current and historical sources, while the latter are based on ratings from some 4,000 experts specialized by country and dimension. These experts are carefully selected to reflect diverse perspectives, and their responses are processed using a Bayesian Item Response Theory (IRT) model to reduce individual biases and increase accuracy. Full details on the methodology are at https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/reference-materi al-v11/. In additional analyses, we conduct a principal component analysis and find that our results remain robust when using the first principal component, which captures the most variation in our political trust variables.

[15] While our variable of primary interest is the aggregate index of institutional corruption, we also examine the results of each component in a later section.

indicating more corruption. Online Appendix Figure 1 displays the time series of the corruption index used in the main analysis for 196 countries. The figure highlights the variation for India, Iran, Italy, and Russia for illustrative purposes. These suggest that exposure to corruption varies by country but, importantly, also across cohorts within countries.

We use country of birth to identify first-generation immigrants.[16] We also construct a sample of natives born in the country of residence, whose fathers and mothers were also born in the country of residence.[17] To control for other aspects of past economic and political shocks in respondents' early adulthood, we use variables from Penn World Tables and Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS). Penn World Tables provide country-level GDP per capita since 1950. CNTS provides data on exchange rates as well as political events such as, assassinations, strikes, purges, riots, revolutions and anti-government demonstrations.

Online Appendix Tables 1A and 1B present the summary statistics for the corruption-exposure, outcome and control variables used in this study.

4. Empirical strategy

Construction of the treatment variable and the importance of early adulthood

Our treatment variable captures the exposure to corruption that individuals experienced during their early adulthood, between the ages of 18 to 25, in their country of origin. The relevance of this life stage in shaping enduring attitudes and values is highlighted in a seminal study by Newcomb and coauthors (Newcomb 1943, Newcomb, Koenig, Flacks, and Warwick 1967). Their study showed that beliefs and values formed during this period persist over long periods. Subsequent research,

[16] First-generation immigrants are defined as the individuals who themselves migrated to the host country (i.e., born outside the host country), whereas second-generation immigrants are individuals who were not foreign-born but whose father and/or mother were immigrants.

[17] We also use a definition of natives as individuals born in the country of residence whose fathers and mothers were not also born in that country. Our results are not sensitive to these different definitions.

such as that by Krosnick and Alwin (1989), identified the formative years as spanning the ages of 18 to 25.[18]

In terms of applications, using survey data from the United States, Cotofan, Cassar, Dur, and Meier (2020) show that job preferences vary in systematic ways with macroeconomic conditions experienced in early adulthood. Recessions create cohorts of workers who give higher priority to income, whereas booms make cohorts care more about job meaning, for the rest of their life. Eichengreen, Aksoy, and Saka (2021) show that exposure to previous epidemics affected young people's trust in science and scientists.

To measure corruption exposure during early adulthood, our treatment variable is calculated as:

$$CorruptionExposure_{io}^{18-25} = \sum_{age=18}^{age=25} CorruptionIndex_{ot} \times I(DepartureAge \geq 25) + \sum_{age=18}^{age=DepartureAge} CorruptionIndex_{ot} \times I(DepartureAge < 25) \quad (1)$$

where $CorruptionExposure_{io}^{18-25}$ corresponds to the V-DEM Corruption Index (i.e., average of executive corruption, judicial corruption, legislative corruption, and public-sector corruption) in the country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25.

If an individual left the country of origin before age 25 ($DepartureAge < 25$), then the measure only includes corruption exposure between age 18 and the age of immigration ($DepartureAge$).[19] By construction, Individuals migrating before age 18 have zero exposure to home-country corruption during early adulthood.[20]

[19] Similarly, if an individual continued to reside in their country of origin beyond age 25. In that case, the baseline measure does not account for the corruption exposure in additional years.

[20] While this measure is our baseline measure of corruption, we also consider alternative measures by changing the age bracket or using the per year corruption exposure instead of the cumulative one. The results are also robust to excluding all individuals who migrated before the age of 18, who therefore have zero exposure.

Main specification

We estimate the following specification:

$$Y_{ihot} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CorruptionExposure_{io}^{18-25} + \beta_2 X_i + \alpha_{cohort} + \alpha_{ho} + \alpha_h \times \alpha_t + \quad (2)$$

$$\alpha_0 \times \alpha_t + \alpha_h \times \alpha_{immigration\ year} + \varepsilon_{ihot}$$

the outcome variable, *Y*, is the index of the level of trust of individual *i* in the political institutions of their host country *h*, where that individual is from home country *o*, and participates in the survey round in year *t*. β_1 captures the effect of early adulthood exposure to corruption in the country of origin on immigrants' trust in host country political institutions. As noted, we explore four measures of political trust: trust in parliament, in politicians, and in political parties, as well as a simple average of these three variables. We estimate ordinary least squares models for ease of interpretation.

The vector X_i includes demographic and labour market controls: age, gender (male), educational attainment (tertiary education, secondary education), and employment status (employed, unemployed).[21]

Cohort fixed effects α_{cohort} account for factors that might affect trust specific to each cohort, which may be important for trust. For example, individuals born in the late 1930s and early 1940s may trust political institutions less because they experienced widespread protests against political systems during their early adulthood in the late 1960s. We therefore include dummies for birth years so as to compare the individuals only within the same birth cohort.

We also include fixed effects for pairs of host (h) and origin country (o) (i.e., α_{ho}). By using origin-destination fixed effects, we exploit the variation between immigrants who come from the

[21] There are many missing values in marital status, religion, living in urban or not, and the presence of children in the household. We do not consider these control variables in our specifications. However, our results are robust to the inclusion of these additional control variables.

same origin country and reside in the same host country yet exposed to different levels of corruption during their formative years. This approach allows us to control for any unobserved, time-invariant factors unique to each origin-destination pair—such as shared cultural or historical influences—isolating the specific impact of corruption exposure on political trust.

We further control for host-country-by-year ($\alpha_h \times \alpha_t$) and origin-country-by-year fixed effects ($\alpha_o \times \alpha_t$) capturing possible omitted host-country and origin-country factors that change with time (such as GDP per capita, population, political regime, etc.). These eliminate heterogeneity in our outcome variables attributable to origin country-specific or host country-specific time-varying factors.

Finally, we include an interaction between host country and year of immigration, $\alpha_h \times \alpha_{immigration\ year}$, which allows us to control for cohort effects for immigrants to a particular country (where cohorts are defined by year of immigration).

As a result, the treatment compares individuals within the same origin-host country pair, birth cohort, and survey year, while controlling for both origin- and host-country-specific time-varying factors and accounting for host country and immigration year interactions to control for immigration cohort effects, ensuring these individuals face the same political institutions, leaders, and time-specific conditions, thereby isolating the effect of pre-migration corruption exposure on political trust.

Standard errors computed with two-way clustering at the origin and host-country level are robust to heteroscedasticity.[22] Although sample weights are not used in the baseline specification, we consider robustness with respect to population size weight and design weight, as provided by ESS.

[22] Our results are also robust to clustering at alternative levels including the origin-destination-country pair level. Results are available upon request.

While using a demanding set of fixed effects helps in obtaining unbiased estimates of the role of past exposure to corruption on political trust, it also reduces variation. Online Appendix Figure 2 plots the distribution of residuals after accounting for each set of fixed effects. Each line corresponds to the set of fixed effects used in each model presented in our main estimation table (Table 1). While the sequential increase in the number of fixed effects slightly reduces the dispersion of residuals, substantial variation remains even in the most saturated model.

5. Main Results

Table 1 shows that exposure to home-country corruption during early adulthood (ages 18-25) *increases* immigrants' political trust in the host country. Panel A uses the political trust index that averages all outcomes, while the subsequent panels consider, successively, trust in parliament, political parties, and politicians. Column (1) includes pair (host-origin country) fixed effects. Column (2) adds cohort fixed effects and demographic and labour market controls. Column (3) introduces host-country-by-survey-year fixed effects, controlling for potential omitted variables that vary across host countries and years and comparing immigrants living in the same host country in the same survey year. Column (4) adds host-country-by-immigration-year fixed effects. In column (5), we include origin-country-by-survey-year fixed effects, controlling for potential omitted variables that vary across home countries and years. This nets out home country economic and political conditions that change over time. In column (6), we additionally control for GDP per capita in the country of origin during the immigrant's early adulthood.[23] In all remaining analyses, we include the complete set of controls in column (5), while using the version controlling for GDP as a robustness check.

[23] Because GDP data from Penn World Tables is not available until 1950, including this variable reduces the sample size.

The coefficients on early adulthood home-country corruption exposure are uniformly positive and significant. To facilitate interpretation, we interpret our results in terms of standardized coefficients. Column 5 of Table 1 suggests that a one standard deviation increase in immigrants' corruption exposure (i.e., an increase of 1.92 units on a scale from 1-7.6) increases their average political trust in host institutions by approximately 0.044 standard deviations in the level of trust. Moreover, in the Online Appendix Table 2, we also report an analog of Table 1 where we recode the dependent variables as 0 when recorded as 5 or less and as 1 when recorded as greater than 5 (the untransformed dependent variables run on a scale from 0 to 10).

It is worth reemphasizing how different our results are from earlier studies finding persistence in, inter alia, fertility, marriage and labour-force behavior of immigrants. That literature finds that individuals display the same attitudes and behaviors before and after immigration, even when the attitudes and behaviors of natives in the country of destination are quite different. In contrast, we show that individuals display very different attitudes before and after immigration, when it comes to trust in political institutions. This contrasting result is consistent with a "reference point" as opposed to a pure "persistence" interpretation, as we explain below. The reference point perspective suggests that immigrants assess political institutions in their host country through the lens of formative experiences from their origin country, rather than solely based on their current observations. In this view, early exposure to factors such as corruption or institutional quality provides a benchmark against which host-country institutions are evaluated. This approach allows for a degree of flexibility, as immigrants continuously measure the host environment against their formative reference, adjusting their trust if the host-country conditions diverge significantly from those in their origin.

Persistence

We study persistence in Table 2, where we consider (i) an interaction between exposure to corruption in early adulthood and length of stay in the host country, and (ii) also test the quadratic relationship between length of stay and political trust of immigrants on the grounds that political trust may decline with the length of stay in the destination country, as immigrants gain more exposure to destination country institutions. These interaction terms are statistically insignificant and very small in magnitude, suggesting that the effect persists over time.

Are effects specific to the early adulthood exposure?

One may be concerned that our focus on early adulthood is arbitrary and restrictive. We, therefore, re-estimate our specification for alternative age windows (0-9, 10-17, 26-33, and 34+). Table 3 shows that the impact on political trust is statistically insignificant when individuals are exposed to corruption before age 18 or after age 25.[24] The positive effect of home-country exposure is only evident when such exposure is during the individual's early adulthood.

More political action

Table 4 reports evidence on actual political behaviour. More political trust in the host country leads to more political action: immigrants more exposed to corruption in their early adulthood in their country of origin are more likely to be interested in politics, to have voted in the last election, and to have worked in a political party or political action group in the last 12 months. The findings highlight a significant connection between immigrants' political trust and their subsequent engagement in the democratic landscape through various political activities.

[24] The absence of an effect for younger individuals is consistent with evidence in Hess and Torney (1967) that young children associate politics with individuals rather than institutions.

Mechanisms

Our results can be interpreted in terms Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) reference-point hypothesis. In the present context, their hypothesis suggests that when current institutions compare favorably with institutions on whose basis attitudes and expectations were formed, the former are viewed more positively in an absolute sense. In our setting, attitudes and expectations are shaped by first-hand experience in early adulthood (between ages 18 and 25). Thus, when individuals are exposed to low-quality political institutions in their country of origin during this stage of the life cycle, they come to regard that level of institutional quality as the norm and adopt it as a reference point. When institutions in the country of immigration then compare favorably with that reference point, individuals regard those institutions more positively in an absolute sense.

In addition, two further additional factors may matter for how individuals evaluate current outcomes relative to the reference point formed on the basis of earlier life exposure: differences in GDP per capita, and differences in levels of democracy between host and home countries. Differences in living standards and differences in political conditions between two countries may direct attention toward differences in the quality of their respective institutions. If so, this may amplify the impact on evaluations of the quality of institutions in the host country of reference-point conditions in the country of origin.

We therefore examine whether first-generation immigrants exhibit greater political trust when there are substantial differences in living conditions between their countries of origin and destination at the time of immigration. To do so, we calculate the differences in GDP per capita and V-DEM democracy scores between the two countries for each respondent in our sample. We then create an indicator variable equal to 1 if the observation is above the median difference, reflecting larger disparities in economic and political conditions across all respondents. Finally, we interact

this indicator variable with our main explanatory variable to analyze whether there is a differential effect for countries with differences above and below the median.[25]

Panels A and B of Table 5 confirms that the effect of home-country exposure to corruption is amplified by large differences between the home and host country in terms of GDP per capita (Panel A) and democracy (Panel B). An interpretation is that better living and political conditions in the destination country lead to more positive evaluations of the political performance of the host country relative to the international-reference-point benchmark.[26]

Media consumption as a mediating factor

Finally, we consider whether media consumption in the destination country mitigates or reinforces the reference-point effect (Panel C and D of Tables 5). We again use our fully saturated specification (Column 5 of Table 1) but now interact our treatment variable with measures of media consumption. The ESS reports four media channels: newspaper, TV, radio, and the internet. We group the three traditional forms of media (newspaper, TV and radio) together while keeping modern electronic media (internet) separate.[27]

Results presented in Panel C and D show that media consumption in the host country reduces the impact of early corruption exposure on trust in host-country political institutions. An interpretation is that media consumption is associated with greater access to information about the host country, allowing information about the actual quality of host-country institutions, as opposed to memories of home-country institutions formed during early adulthood, to dominate assessments,

[25] Democracy indices are sourced from V-DEM data, and observations with missing values are excluded when calculating these indices.

[26] In contrast, the presence of media (measured as the sum of radio and television sets, newspaper circulation, book production per capita) in the country of origin prior to immigration has no detectable impact on political trust (Panel C).

[27] One potential concern with this exercise is that immigrants are selected on media consumption. Therefore, we further address our concern about the selection bias by implementing a propensity score reweighting approach. Our new results are robust to the propensity score reweighting. The results are available upon request.

weakening the international reference-point effect. A comparison of the coefficients indicates that traditional channels and the internet have similar effects.

6. Robustness

In this section we establish the robustness of the results and consider potential threats to identification. In the first part of the section (6.1) we focus on identification issues related to our analysis. The second part (6.2) explores whether our results are robust to alternative specifications and conceptual concerns.

6.1 Robustness of the identification

More demanding fixed effects and selection on unobservables

Additional analyses, reported in the Online Appendix Table 3.A, show that our results are again similar when we focus on more fine-grained variation by including age × origin country fixed effects (Column 1), age × year × subnational region (Column 2) or both (Column 3). The results are also robust to the inclusion of age-of-arrival fixed effects (Column 4). Essentially, these specifications eliminate the variation that arises from comparing a particular age group to other age groups within the same destination country (or detailed subregion) or the same age group from other origin countries. Instead, they concentrate on the changes in host political trust and exposure to home country corruption over time within a specific age group.

Online Appendix Table 3.B applies a robustness check to evaluate how much stronger the effect of unobservables would need to be, relative to all observables, to fully account for our results. This approach uses the technique developed by Oster (forthcoming), based on Altonji et al. (2005). Using the estimates in all 6 columns of Panel A in Table 1 (which is our baseline table) we report Oster's δ, the level at which the true β_1 from equation (2) would equal zero. This statistic indicates

the degree of selection on unobservables, relative to observables, required to fully explain our results through omitted-variable bias. With all additional controls included, Oster's δ values are 2.06 (Column 5) and 2.16 (Column 6), indicating that unobserved factors would need to exert twice the influence of all observed variables for omitted-variable bias to explain the results. Considering the comprehensive set of fixed effects employed, this scenario appears highly unlikely.

Are we picking up the effects of other shocks?

Our estimates could be capturing early-adulthood exposure to other conditions in the home country correlated with the level of corruption, such as democracy, freedom and electoral fraud. We therefore add early-adulthood exposure to five other aspects of institutional quality: electoral democracy, participatory democracy, additive polyarchy, freedom of expression, and clean election; see Online Appendix Table 4.[28] In addition, to insure that other economic and political shocks in the country of origin during the individual's early adulthood are not driving the results, we calculate measures of early-adulthood year exposure to several economic and political shocks (GDP growth, inflation, assassinations, purges, riots, general strikes, terrorist attacks, and so on); see Online Appendix Table 5.

None of these additional controls impacts the coefficients for early adulthood corruption exposure. Point estimates and statistical significance remain stable, indicating that our results are robust to controlling in these ways for additional economic, social, and political exposures that individuals may have experienced in their early adult years.

[28] See Appendix for related variable definitions.

Ruling out pre-trends

We test whether different immigrant age groups within the same host country are on differential trends in terms of their political views, even absent differences in their exposure to corruption. We ask whether pre-birth "exposure" (that is, corruption in a country ten years before the respondent was born) affects political trust. In Online Appendix Table 6, the coefficients on pre-birth exposure are small and insignificant. This confirms that we are not capturing differential trends in the political views of different immigrant age groups across host countries.

6.2 Robustness to Alternative Specifications and Conceptual Concerns

Robustness to alternative corruption measures

In our baseline specification, we measure exposure to corruption cumulatively between ages 18 and 25. In Online Appendix Table 7, we use an alternative measure obtained by dividing the cumulative corruption exposure by the length of stay in the home country. This alternative measure captures the intensity of corruption exposure over a year. The results are again similar, confirming that the estimated effect is not sensitive to how we measure corruption exposure.[29]

Measuring corruption by alternative indices

In our baseline, we use V-DEM for the corruption measure as it provides the largest coverage in terms of country and time. One might be concerned that the results might be driven by how the corruption is measured in this specific index. To ensure that this is not the case, we confirm that the corruption index measured using V-DEM, is highly correlated with measures using measures

[29] Another potential concern related to V-DEM measure is the challenge of measuring corruption especially further back in time. To alleviate any concerns, we run a test where we exclude immigrants who have emigrated prior to 1960. Even when we focus on immigrants who have arrived since that year, the results remain unchanged. The results are available on request.

obtained using World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Pearson Correlation of 0.81) and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (Pearson Correlation of 0.72).

We then reproduced the baseline results when constructing the corruption exposure during early adulthood using the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). WGI scores various dimensions of governance for some 200 countries for the period 1996 and 2021. We construct our corruption measure by using "control of corruption," which is a composite index that includes several indicators measuring the level of public power exercised for private gain and "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.[30] Results in Online Appendix Table 8 show that our results remain robust when using this alternative measure.

Do migrant networks shape perceptions?

It could be that immigrants place more trust in political institutions in a country with a large immigrant population better able, by sheer numbers, to influence the operation of those institutions. We therefore construct a measure of the immigrant network using the Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) and non-OECD destination countries (DIOC-E or DIOC extended).[31] We interact the migrant stock with year fixed effects to construct time-specific trends in the growth of the immigrant population originating in the same country as the respondent. Not only does Online Appendix Table 9 rules out the possibility that such networks drive our results, but the coefficient of interest becomes even stronger.

[30] The World Bank collects perception indicators with information for assessing quality of control of corruption in different countries. Then the WGI corruption measure is obtained by weighting the average of individual indicators of corruption based on Unobserved Component Model (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2011). See more at https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents

[31] See more detail in https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm. Because the OECD database is only available every five years, we measure immigrant networks using the total number of immigrants in 2005, the year closest to the start of our sample.

Controlling for income deciles

Our baseline specification does not control for household income, as it may be influenced by individuals' past experiences in their home countries. However, as a robustness check, we include household income deciles (since the data does not provide actual income but only within-country income deciles). The results, presented in Online Appendix Table 10, remain unchanged when household income deciles are added to the specification.

Can a specific type of corruption be driving the results?

In the baseline, corruption exposure is calculated as the average of executive corruption, judicial corruption, legislative corruption, and public sector corruption. Online Appendix Table 11 investigates how the sub-components matter for trust in political institutions. We present separate point estimates for each treatment variable to facilitate interpretation. While all four indicators matter for political trust, home-country executive corruption and public sector corruption have the strongest effects on immigrants' political trust in the destination.

Robustness to using sampling weights

To account for the fact that countries in the ESS have different population sizes, we weight our regressions by host-country population. We also correct for the under- and over-representation of ESS respondents by using the sampling weight provided by the ESS. Online Appendix Table 12 shows that the results are qualitatively similar to those from unweighted regressions.

Multiple hypothesis tests

We conducted multiple hypothesis testing using the randomization inference technique of Young (2019). This helps to establish the robustness of our results both for individual treatment coefficients in separate estimations and also for the null that our treatment does not have any effect across any of the outcome variables. Online Appendix Table 13 shows that our findings remain robust both for the individual coefficients and the joint tests of treatment significance.

Ruling out influential observations

To check whether our results are driven by influential observations, we exclude migrants whose corruption exposure is in the top 5 percentiles of the distribution. Panel A of Online Appendix Table 14 shows that results remain robust. The results also remain robust to the exclusion of immigrants from countries with fewer than 150 immigrants or more than 1000 immigrants (Panels B and C, Online Appendix Table 14).

One might be concerned that the migrants coming from Russia and other former Soviet Republics countries associate differences in economic models with differences in political institutions. Panel D of the Online Appendix Table 14 excludes immigrants from these countries. Results remain unchanged.

Results are also robust to the exclusion of migrants coming from specific continents, distinguishing cohorts of migrants by decade of arrival, and excluding those coming from former colonies or countries with socialist legal origin, from those with high ethnic diversity, and from those with low polity scores or high inequality. Results remain unchanged.[32]

Focusing on migrants from less corrupt countries?

Much of the sample consists of immigrants coming from countries with higher levels of corruption compared to their host countries. One might be concerned that the effect captured in the analysis is due not to past corruption but to a third factor related to moving from to a less corrupt country. To dispel this concern, we focus only on a subsample of immigrants coming from countries with corruption levels that are lower than their host countries. While sample size falls dramatically, the results, in Online Appendix Table 15, again remain unchanged.

[32] These further results are available on request.

7. Additional analysis

In this section, we provide additional results to test whether past exposure to corruption has uneven effects on individuals with different education backgrounds, and how if at all the political trust of natives is affected.[33]

Do effects vary with education?

The analysis here focuses on the impact of past exposure to corruption on the political trust on average of all migrants. However, some migrants might be more sensitive to these past effects if they are more perceptive or better informed as a result of exposure to education.[34]

Online Appendix Table 16 confirms that more educated individuals are more influenced by early adulthood exposure. An interpretation is that more educated individuals are more involved in and conscious of politics at this age. They may be more active as citizens, translating into a stronger effect of early adulthood exposure to political institutions.

Are natives exposed to corruption also more trusting?

The evidence presented so far shows that past exposure to corruption tends to increase the trust that immigrants vest in the host-country institutions. To benchmark our immigrant analysis, we replicate the same analysis for the sample of natives, again derived from the European Social Survey, while introducing the same set of controls.[35] Online Appendix Table 17 confirms a difference between the two groups. As indicated in Column 1, more exposure of natives to corruption in their formative

[33] We also examine the heterogeneity effect between naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants by interacting the corruption exposure variable with the citizenship status as an additional exercise. As a result, we do find that being naturalized mitigates the positive effect of corruption exposure on political trusts. Once immigrants become citizens, the overall effect of corruption exposure is somewhat weaker. The results are available upon request.

[34] One potential concern with this exercise is that immigrants are selected on education. Therefore, we further address our concern about the selection bias by implementing a propensity score reweighting approach. Our new results are robust to the propensity score reweighting. The results are available upon request.

[35] We construct a sample of natives born in the country of residence, whose fathers and mothers were also born in the country of residence. The only difference between the two sets of controls lies in the host country fixed effects, which is present only in the immigrant sample.

years is associated with *less* political trust, the opposite of what we find for immigrants. The results are significant for each of our four proxies of political trust. We obtain similar results, albeit slightly stronger in magnitude, when also excluding second-generation immigrants (see Column 2).[36] Magnitudes are similar to those for the immigrant sample, but opposite in sign, as noted.

In contrast to the results for immigrants, we do not observe any heterogeneity among natives by level of education. In addition, the mitigating effect of media exposure is considerably smaller than that observed for immigrants.[37] Again, this highlights differences between immigrants, whose attitudes toward their host country are shaped by a foreign reference point, and native individuals.

Trust of second-generation immigrants

To study second-generation immigrants, we construct their corruption exposure during their impressionable years. Second-generation immigrants are individuals born in the host country but whose parents were immigrants. As such, they are exposed to host-country corruption during their formative years, similar to native-born individuals. Unfortunately, we cannot measure the corruption exposure of their parents as we do not know when they arrived to the host country, we estimate second-generation immigrants' exposure based on the corruption levels in their host countries during their impressionable years.

Online Appendix Table 18 presents the regression analysis, where we present the impact of corruption exposure for natives excluding the second-generation (Column 1), the first-generation immigrants (Column 2), and the second-generation immigrants (Column 3). We find that second-generation immigrants, like natives, show lower political trust when exposed to higher levels of corruption in the host country. This differs from first-generation immigrants, who tend to use their

[36] We do so under the assumption that inertia in cultural attitudes may extend even to the second generation of immigrants in a country.
[37] These additional results are available on request.

origin countries' institutions as a reference point.

Are the effects non-linear?

Online Appendix Table 19 tests for the presence of non-linear effects by introducing the squared term of early adulthood corruption exposure, which allows for the effect of corruption exposure on political trust to increase up to a certain point and then decrease beyond that point. We find a weakly significant and quantitatively small effect of the quadratic term.

8. Ruling out selection based on political trust

In this sub-section we examine whether our results can be explained by self-selection of migrants into destinations based on political trust. First, as a broader comment about our identification strategy, our identification strategy relies on origin-destination pair fixed effects. By introducing origin-destination pair fixed effects, we control for time-invariant factors specific to each origin-destination pair. This means that differences between immigrants in terms of pre-migration corruption exposure are analyzed within the context of each specific origin-destination pair. Any characteristic that makes individuals more likely to migrate from a particular origin to a particular destination will be accounted for in this fixed effect. Moreover, by focusing on relative differences in corruption exposure among immigrants from the same origin country who all migrate to the same host country, our approach compares only those who have already made the decision to migrate. This within-group comparison can mitigate selection bias because it does not compare migrants to non-migrants, but rather to other migrants who may share many similar selection factors (like the decision to emigrate from the same origin country).

Are immigrants more trusting?

Immigrants are self-selected by ability, education, risk-tolerance, and social attitudes (Chiswick, 1999; Heitmueller, 2005; Aksoy and Poutvaara, 2021). What is relevant here, however, is not

selection in general but selection on political trust. Suppose, for example, that more trusting individuals have a tendency to select into immigration. Immigrants' higher political trust in host-country institutions then might reflect their trusting nature, as opposed to their exposure to corruption in their home country.

We know of no evidence that more trusting individuals select into immigration. In any case, our identification strategy compares not immigrants and natives but, rather, the corruption exposure of different immigrants. If the selection bias resulting from immigrants' trusting nature relates to their identity as immigrants, then our estimates of differences in political trust within the immigrant group will not be biased by selection.

Alternatively, immigrants could display unusually high levels of trust in host-country institutions not because of their status as immigrants but because of other unobserved factors. This makes it important to explore whether immigrants are selected on other dimensions of trust and social attitudes. In Online Appendix Table 20 we check the effect of early adulthood corruption exposure on eight other dimensions of trust and non-political attitudinal outcomes. The outcomes are Trust in the United Nations (Panel A), Social trust (Panel B), People are fair (Panel C), People try to be helpful (Panel D), Important to understand different people (Panel E), Important to help people and care for others well-being (Panel F), Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people close (Panel G), and Important to try new and different things in life (Panel H). Particularly, the result for trust in the United Nations is statistically insignificant in Online Appendix Table 20. Finding no effect of corruption exposure on the United Nations is in line with our reference point hypothesis because immigrants would not change the reference point for the international institution whether they are in origin or destination countries.

Column 1 presents results for our main sample, while column 2 focuses on European immigrants only. We find no relationship between past corruption exposure and these variables,

suggesting that self-selection into host countries on the basis of trust is unlikely. This is consistent with our hypothesis that any gain of trust by individuals with earlier corruption exposure is specific to host country political institutions and not a reflection of general of trust in host society.

Balance tests

A possible concern is that immigrants coming from countries with institutional and economic problems select into host countries which they think have good and trustworthy institutions. We therefore implement a balance test examining whether immigrant status is uncorrelated with observable institutional characteristics (different population sizes, military expenses, GDP, etc.). Online Appendix Table 21 confirms that our treatment is not correlated with these host country characteristics, confirming that in this sense it is plausibly exogenous.

We also contend with the selection into the migration of a specific set of cohorts. For example, migrants might have a lower social-economic status that determines their subsequent political trust in host country institutions. We there provide a cohort-level analysis examining whether cohorts exposed to different levels of corruption during early adulthood differ substantially in terms of age, gender, education, ethnicity, household income and employment rate from other cohorts. Online Appendix Table 22 shows that none of these socio-demographic characteristics (that is, age, gender, marital status, education and religion) is correlated with host country GDP, government revenue, defense expenditure, school enrolment per capita, and physicians per capita. This supports the view that the migrants' main observable characteristics are orthogonal to destination-country characteristics.

Finally, in Online Appendix Table 23, we regress individual characteristics—such as age, gender, education, marital status, and religious affiliation—on immigrant status, while controlling for individuals' country of origin. The results indicate that there is little to no correlation between immigrant status and these characteristics. This provides additional evidence that, within the same

country of origin, immigrants do not differ substantially from non-immigrants in terms of these observable characteristics.

Migrants from countries affected by war

As an additional test to alleviate concerns related to selection, we focus on immigrants originating from countries experiencing wars. As people fleeing wars are less likely to be selected based on their observable or unobservable characteristics, limiting the analysis to such individuals should further mitigate selection concerns (Bahar et al., 2024).

We rely on Correlates of War Dataset (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010) which offers extensive data on conflicts from 1816 onwards, including inter-state, extra-state, and intra-state wars. We match individual-level migration data with the incidence of war in the migration year. This allows us to examine the impact of war as a driver of migration, focusing on wars likely to have affected entire countries.

We therefore restrict our sample to immigrants coming from countries that experienced any type of war (Panel A of Online Appendix Table 24) or only wars that involve third countries (Panel B) in the year before they migrated.[38] While restricting the sample to individuals coming only form countries affected by a war reduces the sample size, the results confirm our benchmark results.

8. Conclusion

Lower institutional quality in an immigrant's country of origin is associated with a *more* favourable evaluation of host-country institutions. This pattern can be explained by the tendency of an immigrant to evaluate the quality of current host-country institutions relative to the quality of the home-country institutions to which they were exposed in the past. What matters is exposure to

[38] The results are robust to focusing on immigrants originating from countries who experienced a war in the same year of migration (i.e., in year *t*).

corruption during early adulthood (ages 18-25), not exposure overall. This last finding is consistent with work in sociology, psychology, cognitive science, and economics on the importance of early adulthood.

Political commentators and leaders worry about whether immigrants have adequate regard for their host-country institutions, values, and cultures. Some scholars advocate immigration restrictions on grounds of avoiding degradation of host-country norms, values and institutions by immigrants bringing very different values. In response, some governments restricted immigration, while others have adopted practices intended to impart better understanding and greater respect for host-country institutions.[39] These initiatives reflect the belief that immigrants from countries with poor institutional quality will import skepticism about the quality of host-country institutions. In fact, when it comes to political attitudes and behaviors, such immigrants hold host-country institutions in higher, not lower, regard. In this respect, they may be easier, not harder, than the average citizen to integrate into host-country politics and society.

[39] Examples include the Dutch citizenship test and citizenship education in UK schools designed to impart a sense of "Britishness" (Miller and Ali, 2014).

References

Acemoglu, Daron, Nicolás Ajzenman, Cevat Giray Aksoy, Martin Fiszbein, and Carlos Molina. "(Successful) Democracies Breed Their Own Support." *The Review of Economic Studies*, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae051.

Aksoy, Cevat Giray, Barry Eichengreen, and Orkun Saka. "Revenge of the Experts: Will COVID-19 Renew or Diminish Public Trust in Science?" *Journal of Public Economics* 193 (2021): 104343.

Aksoy, Cevat Giray, and Panu Poutvaara. "Refugees' and Irregular Migrants' Self-selection into Europe." *Journal of Development Economics* 152 (2021): 102681.

Alesina, Alberto, and Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln. "Good-bye Lenin (or not?): The Effect of Communism on People's Preferences." *American Economic Review* 97, no. 4 (2007): 1507-1528.

Alesina, Alberto, and Paola Giuliano. "The Power of the Family." *Journal of Economic Growth* 15, no. 2 (2010): 93-125.

Bahar, Dany, Andreas Hauptmann, Cem Özgüzel, and Hillel Rapoport. "Migration and Knowledge Diffusion: The Effect of Returning Refugees on Export Performance in the Former Yugoslavia." *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 106, no. 2 (2024): 287-304.

Bargain, Olivier, and Ulugbek Aminjonov. "Trust and Compliance to Public Health Policies in Times of COVID-19." *Journal of Public Economics* 192 (2020): 104316.

Borjas, G. J. (2014). "Immigration Economics." *Harvard University Press.*

Borjas, George J. "Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay." *Journal of Economic Literature* 53, no. 4 (2015): 961-974.

Chiswick, Barry R. "Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected?" *The American Economic Review* 89, no. 2 (1999): 181–85.

Chong, Alberto, Ana L. De La O, Dean Karlan, and Leonard Wantchekon. "Does Corruption

Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification." *The Journal of Politics* 77, no. 1 (2015): 55-71.

Clemens, Michael A., and Lant Pritchett. "The New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions: An Assessment." *Journal of Development Economics* 138 (2019): 153-164.

Collier, Paul. "Exodus: How Migration is Changing our World." Oxford University Press (2013).

Cotofan, Maria, Lea Cassar, Robert Dur, and Stephan Meier. "Macroeconomic Conditions When Young Shape Job Preferences for Life." *Review of Economics and Statistics* (2021): 1-20.

Daniele, Gianmarco, Arnstein Aassve, and Marco Le Moglie. "Never Forget the First Time: The Persistent Effects of Corruption and the Rise of Populism in Italy." *The Journal of Politics* 85, no. 2 (2023): 468-483.

Easton, David. "A Systems Analysis of Political Life." New York: Wiley (1965).

Easton, David and Jack Dennis. "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political efficacy." *American Political Science Review* 61, no.1 (1967): 25-38.

Eichengreen, Barry, Orkun Saka, and Cevat Giray Aksoy. "The Political Scar of Epidemics." The Economic Journal 134, no. 660 (2024): 1683-1700.

Eichengreen, Barry, Cevat Giray Aksoy, and Orkun Saka. "Revenge of the Experts: Will COVID-19 Renew or Diminish Public Trust in Science?." *Journal of Public Economics* 193 (2021): 104343.

Fernández, Raquel, and Alessandra Fogli. "Culture: An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs, Work, and Fertility." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 1, no. 1 (2009): 146-77.

Fisman, Raymond, and Edward Miguel. "Corruption, Norms, and Legal enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets." *Journal of Political Economy* 115, no. 6 (2007): 1020-1048.

Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. "Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20, no. 2 (2006): 23-48.

Guiso, Luigi, Helios Herrera, Massimo Morelli, and Tommaso Sonno. "Economic insecurity and

the demand for populism in Europe." Economica 91, no. 362 (2024): 588-620.

Guriev, Sergei, and Elias Papaioannou. “The Political Economy of Populism.” *Journal of Economic Literature*, 60, no. 3 (2022): 753-832.

Gutmann, Jerg, Fabio Padovano, and Stefan Voigt. "Perception vs. Experience: Explaining Differences in Corruption Measures Using Microdata." *European Journal of Political Economy* 65 (2020): 101925.

Heitmueller, Axel. "Unemployment Benefits, Risk Aversion, and Migration Incentives." *Journal of Population Economics* 18, no. 1 (2005): 93-112.

Hess, Robert and Judith Torney. “The Development of Political Attitudes in Children.” Chicago: Aldine Publishing (1967).

Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.” *Econometrica* 47 no.2 (1979): 363-391.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. "The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues." *Hague Journal on the rule of law* 3, no. 2 (2011): 220-246.

Krosnick, Jon A., and Duane F. Alwin. "Aging and Susceptibility to Attitude Change." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 57, no. 3 (1989): 416.

Levi, Margaret and Laura Stoker. “Political Trust and Trustworthiness,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 3 (2000): 475-507.

Locke, John. *Second Treatise of Government*. Edited by C. B. Macpherson, Hackett Publishing, 1980. (Originally published in 1690).

Luttmer, Erzo and Monica Singhal. “Culture, Context, and the Taste for Redistribution.” *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 3, no. 1 (2011): 157-79.

Miller, David, and Sundas Ali. “Testing the National Identity Argument.” *European Political*

Science Review 6, no. 2 (2014): 237-259.

Newcomb, T. “Personality and Social Change: Attitude Formation in a Student Community.” New York: Dryden (1943).

Newcomb, T., K. Koenig, R. Flacks and D. Warwick. “Persistence and Change: Bennington College and its Students After 25 Years.*”* New York: Wiley (1967).

Nowrasteh, Alex, and Benjamin Powell. “Wretched Refuse?” Cambridge University Press, (2020).

Olken, Benjamin "Corruption Perceptions vs Corruption Reality." *Journal of Public Economics* 93, no. 7-8 (2009): 950-964.

Papaioannou, Elias. "Trust(ing) in Europe. How Increased Social Capital Can Contribute to Economic Development.” CES Research Paper (2013): 1-130.

Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman. Resort to War: 1816 – 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press (2010).

Shiller, Robert J., Maxim Boycko, Vladimir Korobov, Sidney G. Winter, and Thomas Schelling. "Hunting for Homo Sovieticus: Situational versus Attitudinal Factors in economic Behaviour." *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, no. 1 (1992): 127-194.

Sundström, Aksel, and Daniel Stockemer. “Regional Variation in Voter Turnout in Europe: The Impact of Corruption Perceptions.” *Electoral Studies* 40 (2015): 158-169.

Table 1: Impact of Corruption Exposure (18-25) on Political Trust

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A | Outcome: Political Trust Index						
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.090***	0.098***	0.100***	0.053***	0.053***	0.057***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Mean of the outcome	4.049	4.049	4.049	4.049	4.049	4.049
Observations	24911	23360	23360	22891	22713	19023
R^2	0.221	0.231	0.257	0.317	0.341	0.348
Panel B | Outcome: Trust in Parliament						
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.090***	0.097***	0.101***	0.045**	0.048**	0.053**
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Mean of the outcome	4.695	4.695	4.695	4.695	4.695	4.695
Observations	25813	24199	24199	23724	23548	19687
R^2	0.198	0.211	0.237	0.296	0.320	0.327
Panel C | Outcome: Trust in Parties						
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.078***	0.087***	0.087***	0.048**	0.045**	0.050***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Mean of the outcome	3.738	3.738	3.738	3.738	3.738	3.738
Observations	25844	24233	24233	23760	23587	19789
R^2	0.183	0.191	0.211	0.272	0.296	0.308
Panel D | Outcome: Trust in Politicians						
A	0.095***	0.100***	0.102***	0.055***	0.053***	0.056***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Mean of the outcome	3.754	3.754	3.754	3.754	3.754	3.754
Observations	26221	24590	24590	24113	23935	20098
R^2	0.190	0.199	0.220	0.280	0.304	0.318
Paired Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic and labour market cont.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Year	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Immigration Year	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Origin Country × Year	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
GDP Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Number of Origin Countries	196	196	196	196	196	196
Number of Host Countries	38	38	38	38	38	38

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. This table estimates of the baseline model specified in equation (2). Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each panel displays the result for a different political trust variable. The political trust index is defined as the average trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. Paired country fixed effects are host country×origin country paired level fixed effects. Demographic and labour market controls include: age, a male dummy, employment status, and educational attainment (tertiary education, secondary education). Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Table 2: Persistence Over Time

	(1)	(2)	(2)	(4)
Outcome è	Political Trust Index	Trust in Parliament	Trust in Parties	Trust in Politicians
Panel A				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ × Length of stay	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.102***	0.101***	0.089***	0.105***
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.028)
Length of stay	-0.008***	-0.010***	-0.007***	-0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	23189	24031	24067	24418
R^2	0.282	0.263	0.236	0.245
Panel B				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ × Length of stay-squared	0.000**	0.000**	0.000*	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ × Length of stay	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.083***	0.073**	0.074***	0.090***
	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Length of stay-squared	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Length of stay	-0.030***	-0.036***	-0.027***	-0.030***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	23189	24031	24067	24418
R^2	0.284	0.264	0.237	0.246

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. This table reports estimates of the baseline model specified in equation (2) with additional interaction terms: length of stay in host country and its squared term (in Panels A and B). Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each column displays the result of a different political trust variable. Each panel displays the result of a different regression. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure18-25 corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin o when individual i is between ages 18 and 25. The specification includes the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. See notes to Table 1. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Table 3: Impact of Corruption Exposure on Political Trust in Alternative Treatment Years

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome è	Political Trust Index	Trust in Parliament	Trust in Parties	Trust in Politicians
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.057**	0.068**	0.040*	0.047*
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Corruption Exposure$_{0\text{-}9}$	0.017	0.025	0.014	-0.006
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Corruption Exposure$_{10\text{-}17}$	-0.022	-0.028	-0.020	0.001
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.025)
Corruption Exposure$_{26\text{-}33}$	0.014	0.001	0.022*	0.018
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Corruption Exposure$_{34+}$	0.015	0.018	0.020	0.012
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)
p-value	0.010	0.000	0.049	0.209
Observations	20646	21410	21458	21777
R^2	0.331	0.312	0.288	0.295

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. This table reports estimates of the baseline model specified in equation (2). Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each panel displays the result of a different political trust variable. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when individual *i* is between ages, 0 and 9, 10 and 17, 18 and 25, 26-33 and 34+. P-value reports the results of a joint test of the coefficients equality in the regression. The joint tests are: (1) Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ - Corruption Exposure$_{0\text{-}9}$= 0; (2) Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ - Corruption Exposure$_{10\text{-}17}$=0; (3) Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ - Corruption Exposure$_{26\text{-}33}$ =0; (4) Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ - Corruption Exposure$_{34+}$=0. The specification includes the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. See notes to Table 1. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Table 4: Impact on Political Behaviour

	(1)	(2)
Panel A | Political action index		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.005***	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	19231	18678
R^2	0.283	0.330
Panel B | Voted in the last nat. election		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.011***	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	19328	18774
R^2	0.342	0.388
Panel C | Worked in political party in the last 12 months		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.001***	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Observations	27388	26772
R^2	0.126	0.165
Panel D | Contacted politician or government official last 12 months		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.005**	0.004**
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	27372	26758
R^2	0.138	0.174
Paired Country Fixed Effects	No	Yes
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Demographic and labour market cont.	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Year	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Immigration Year	Yes	Yes
Origin Country × Year	Yes	Yes

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. Political action index in Panel A refers to the average of the outcome variables used in Panels B-D. Panel B displays the result of voting in the last national election, where vote equals to "1" if individuals voted in the election, and "0" if not voted. Panel C displays the results of working in political party. Working in political party is coded as "1" if individuals worked in political party and "0" if not. Panel D shows the results of contacting politician or government official last 12 month or not and is coded as "1" if individuals contacted and "0" if not. Corruption Exposure18-25 corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. Paired country fixed effects are host country × origin country paired level fixed effects. Demographic and labour market controls include: age, a male dummy, employment status, and educational attainment (tertiary education, secondary education). Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Table 5: Mechanisms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome è	Political Trust Index	Trust in Parliament	Trust in Parties	Trust in Politicians
Panel A | Differences in GDP per capita				
High Δ GDP× Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.041*	0.045*	0.049*	0.042*
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.054***	0.052***	0.045***	0.065***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Observations	21974	22774	22788	23116
R^2				
Panel B | Differences in Democracy				
High Δ Democracy× Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.052***	0.058***	0.042**	0.049**
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.052***	0.056***	0.049***	0.054***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Observations	21974	22774	22788	23116
R^2				
Panel C | the Role of Traditional Media Consumption				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ × Traditional Media	-0.093**	-0.078	-0.076*	-0.119***
	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.038)
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.159***	0.129***	0.152***	0.184***
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Observations	5385	5537	5547	5615
R^2	0.354	0.334	0.309	0.329
Panel D | the Role of Internet Usage				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ × Internet	-0.096***	-0.108***	-0.090***	-0.090***
	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.025)
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.160***	0.147***	0.156***	0.162***
	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.044)	(0.048)
Observations	5497	5656	5667	5737
R2	0.356	0.335	0.310	0.329

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each panel displays the result for a different interaction variable. Differences in GDP per capita (democracy) reflects the differences between host and origin country. GDP per capita data is from the Penn World. Democracy measure is from the V-DEM dataset. For each variable, we calculate the average in the individual's early adulthood. We then construct an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the observation is in the above median of early adulthood scores across all respondents. We include this variable categorically rather than in continuous form to limit the likelihood of a response to corruption experience. Traditional media on political/current affairs per week takes the average of newspaper, TV, and radio use on political/current affairs. Internet use is an indicator variable telling whether individuals use internet every month or not. The specification includes the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. See notes to Table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the origin-host country pair level. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix for "Corruption Exposure, Political Trust, and Immigrants"

Appendix Figure 1: Corruption Index for Home-Country Institutions, All Countries



Note: This figure plots the change in corruption index in origin countries over time and highlights five sample countries for illustrative reasons. There are 196 origin countries in the sample.

Appendix Figure 2: Distribution of Residuals After Accounting for Each Set of Fixed Effects



Note: This figure plots the residuals of each model in Table 1.

Appendix Table 1A: Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	Std. Dev.	Observations
Corruption Exposure Variables:			
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	1.57	1.96	28,138
Corruption Exposure$_{0\text{-}18}$	5.34	4.44	25,204
Corruption Exposure$_{25+}$	1.87	3.81	29,509
Per Year Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.24	0.27	28,138
Prebirth Corruption Exposure$_{-10\text{-}0}$	3.38	2.53	24,995
Public Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	1.70	2.10	28,138
Executive Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	1.53	1.95	28,138
Legislative Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-2.88	7.33	25,854
Judicial Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-4.59	8.79	28,138
Political Trust and Other Attitudinal Variables:			
Political Trust Index	4.05	2.30	28,796
Trust in Parliament	4.70	2.66	29,869
Trust in Politicians	3.75	2.51	30,290
Trust in Parties	3.74	2.45	29,855
Trust in UN	4.94	2.74	28,029
People Trust	5.07	2.43	31,634
People Fair	5.51	2.34	31,379
People Help	4.99	2.41	31,533
Important to understand different people	2.24	1.05	30620
Important to help and care for others	-2.10	0.99	30674
Important to be loyal to friends and devote	-1.90	0.92	30646
Important to try new and different things in life	-2.92	1.39	30621
Other Variables:			
GDP Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	3,65483	8,970.95	24,101
Age	49.21	17.47	31,793
Share of Males	44.47	49.69	31,797
Share of Females	55.50	49.70	31,797
Share of Tertiary Education	32.63	46.89	29,824
Share of Unemployed	6.09	23.91	31,797
Length of stay in the destination	24.17	17.02	31,797
News (per week)	1.24	0.98	7,566
TV (per week)	2.03	1.48	7,601
Radio (per week)	1.65	1.64	7,545
Internet	3.53	3.09	7,577

Note: This table reports the unweighted summary statistics.

Appendix Table 1B: Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	Std. Dev.	Observations
Other Aggregate Variables:			
Population (log)	9.28	1.31	31,282
GDP per capita (log)	10.38	0.74	27,703
National government revenue (log)	13.99	0.87	27,703
Imports (log)	16.30	1.24	27,703
Exports (log)	16.24	1.34	27,703
National defense expenditure (log)	10.92	0.81	27,667
Percent GDP originating in industrial activity (log)	3.26	0.24	26,115
Energy consumption in kg. per capita (log)	7.94	0.34	27,703
The number of telephones per capita (log)	11.97	0.15	27,703
Total school enrolment per capita (log)	7.32	0.18	26,001
Physicians per capita (log)	8.18	0.19	21,552
Real Outcomes			
Political action index	0.26	0.22	22906
Voted in the last national election	0.63	0.48	23019
Worked in political party or action group last 12 months	0.03	0.17	31670
Contacted politician or government official last 12 months	0.11	0.32	31656

Note: This table reports the summary statistics of all variables used in this paper.

Appendix Table 2: Impact of Corruption Exposure (18-25) on Political Trust – Binary Outcome Measures

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A | Outcome: Political Trust Index						
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.017***	0.020***	0.020***	0.009**	0.008**	0.008**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mean	0.607	0.607	0.607	0.607	0.607	0.607
Observations	27530	25808	25808	25331	25153	21114
Panel B | Outcome: Trust in Parliament						
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.016***	0.018***	0.019***	0.007*	0.007*	0.007
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Mean	0.620	0.620	0.620	0.620	0.620	0.620
Observations	27530	25808	25808	25331	25153	21114
Panel C | Outcome: Trust in Parties						
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.017***	0.020***	0.020***	0.010**	0.009**	0.010***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Mean	0.472	0.472	0.472	0.472	0.472	0.472
Observations	27530	25808	25808	25331	25153	21114
Panel D | Outcome: Trust in Politicians						
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.019***	0.021***	0.021***	0.009**	0.008**	0.007**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mean	0.479	0.479	0.479	0.479	0.479	0.479
Observations	27530	25808	25808	25331	25153	21114
Paired Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic and labour market cont.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Year	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Immigration Year	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Origin Country × Year	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
GDP Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Number of Origin Countries	196	196	196	196	196	196
Number of Host Countries	38	38	38	38	38	38

Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. This table reports the analogous results to Table 1. Outcomes are coded as binary variables, which are equal to 1 if they are above "5" (indicating trust) and equal to 0 if below "5" (indicating no trust). Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. Paired country fixed effects are host country×origin country paired level fixed effects. Demographic and labour market controls include: age, a male dummy, employment status, and educational attainment (tertiary education, secondary education). Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 3.A: Impact of Corruption Exposure (18-25) on Political Trust –Within-Age-Cohort Country, Within-Age-Cohort-Sub-national Region Variation and Within Age-of-Arrival Year

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A | Outcome: Political Trust Index				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.053***	0.045***	0.050***	0.044***
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Mean of the outcome	4.049	4.049	4.049	4.049
Observations	22713	22713	22713	22713
Panel B | Outcome: Trust in Parliament				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.048**	0.038**	0.047**	0.037**
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Mean of the outcome	4.695	4.695	4.695	4.695
Observations	23548	23548	23548	23548
Panel C | Outcome: Trust in Parties				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.045**	0.037**	0.044**	0.037**
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Mean of the outcome	3.738	3.738	3.738	3.738
Observations	23587	23587	23587	23587
Panel D | Outcome: Trust in Politicians				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.053***	0.044***	0.051***	0.043**
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Mean of the outcome	3.754	3.754	3.754	3.754
Observations	23935	23935	23935	23935
Baseline controls (Specification 5 of Table 1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age × Origin Country Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
Age × Year × Subnational Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No
Age-of-Arrival Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes
Number of Origin Countries	196	196	196	196
Number of Host Countries	38	38	38	38

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. This table shows the estimated results after adding age-cohort-country or -region fixed effects to baseline model specified in equation (2). Column (1) presents the results of adding age-by-origin country fixed effects, column (2) shows that of adding age-by-subnational region fixed effects, and column (3) shows the results of including both. Column (4) presents results with age of arrival year fixed effects. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each panel displays the result of a different political trust variable. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country-of-origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Table 3B: Impact of Corruption Exposure (18-25) on Political Trust - Oster Test

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A | Outcome: Political Trust Index						
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.090***	0.098***	0.100***	0.053***	0.053***	0.057***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Mean of the outcome	4.049	4.049	4.049	4.049	4.049	4.049
Observations	24911	23360	23360	22891	22713	19023
R^2	0.221	0.231	0.257	0.317	0.341	0.348
Oster's δ	**1.3**	**1.45**	**1.83**	**1.05**	**2.06**	**2.16**
Paired Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic and labor market cont.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Year	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Immigration Year	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Origin Country × Year	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
GDP Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Number of Origin Countries	196	196	196	196	196	196
Number of Host Countries	38	38	38	38	38	38

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. This table estimates the baseline model specified in equation (2) and further reports Oster's δ. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each panel displays the result for a different political trust variable. The political trust index is defined as the average trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country-of-origin *o* when individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. Paired country fixed effects are host country×origin country paired level fixed effects. Demographic and labor market controls include: age, a male dummy, employment status, and educational attainment (tertiary education, secondary education). Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 4: Robustness to Controlling for Other Institutional Quality Measures

Outcome ➔	Political Trust Index	Trust in Parliament	Trust in Parties	Trust in Politicians
Panel A | Controlling for Electoral Democracy				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.053***	0.049**	0.046**	0.053***
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Electoral Democracy Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.010	-0.016	-0.016	-0.011
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Panel B | Controlling for Participatory Democracy				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.052***	0.048**	0.045**	0.053***
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Participatory Democracy Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.016	-0.023	-0.025	-0.015
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.021)
Panel C | Controlling for Electoral Principle of Democracy				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.055***	0.052***	0.048**	0.055***
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Additive Polyarchy Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.009	-0.016	-0.013	-0.009
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Panel D | Controlling for Freedom Expression				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.055***	0.052***	0.048**	0.055***
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Freedom Expression Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.012	-0.020*	-0.015	-0.013
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Panel E | Controlling for Clean Election				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.053***	0.049**	0.045**	0.053***
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Clean Election Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.008	-0.014	-0.012	-0.006
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***$p<0.001$. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each panel displays the result of a separate regression while controlling for other types of institutional quality measure. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin o when the individual i is between ages 18 and 25. The specification includes the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. Two-way eed standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 5: Robustness to Controlling for Other Economic and Political Shocks

Outcome ➔	Political Trust	Trust in Parliament	Trust in Parties	Trust in Politicians
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.052**	0.048*	0.050*	0.052*
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Assassinations$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Strikes$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.009	0.006	0.015	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Terrorism$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.001	-0.003	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Purges$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.005	0.004	-0.011	-0.003
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Riots$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Revolutions$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.013	0.014	0.017	0.024
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Anti-government$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004*	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
GDP Exposure$_{\text{-}25}$	-0.003	-0.003	-0.005	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Exchange Rate $_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.003**	-0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	16363	16941	17017	17273

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. The political trust is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Each Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ measure corresponds to the sum (i.e., cumulative) of the variable in country of origin *o* when the individual i is between ages 18 and 25. The specification includes the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. See notes to Table 1. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 6: Pre-birth Exposure to Corruption and Political Trust

	(1)
Panel A | Political Trust Index	
Pre-birth Corruption Exposure$_{-10\text{-}0}$	0.003
	(0.019)
Observations	20224
Panel B | Trust in Parliament	
Pre-birth Corruption Exposure$_{-10\text{-}0}$	0.016
	(0.014)
Observations	20971
Panel C | Trust in Parties	
Pre-birth Corruption Exposure$_{-10\text{-}0}$	0.010
	(0.024)
Observations	21024
Panel D | Trust in Politicians	
Pre-birth Corruption Exposure$_{-10\text{-}0}$	-0.007
	(0.030)
Observations	21331
Paired Country Fixed Effects	Yes
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes
Demographic and labour market cont.	Yes
Host Country × Year	Yes
Host Country × Immigration Year	Yes
Origin Country × Year	Yes
Number of Origin Countries	196
Number of Host Countries	38

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***$p<0.001$. This table reports the results by regressing political trust variables on pre-birth corruption exposure, where Pre-birth Corruption Exposure$_{-10\text{-}0}$ measures the sum (i.e., cumulative) of V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* ten years before the individual *i* was born. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each panel displays the result of a different political trust variable. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. The specification includes the full set of controls as Column 5 in Table 1. See notes to Table 1. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 7: Robustness to Alternative Corruption Exposure Measure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A | Outcome: Political Trust Index						
Corruption Exposure Per Year$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.552***	0.601***	0.609***	0.268**	0.242**	0.248**
	(0.102)	(0.088)	(0.079)	(0.109)	(0.113)	(0.110)
Mean of the outcome	4.049	4.049	4.049	4.049	4.049	4.049
Observations	24909	23360	23360	22891	22713	19023
Panel B | Outcome: Trust in Parliament						
Corruption Exposure Per Year $_{18\text{-}25}$	0.552***	0.597***	0.620***	0.216	0.220	0.220
	(0.132)	(0.122)	(0.119)	(0.155)	(0.165)	(0.179)
Mean of the outcome	4.695	4.695	4.695	4.695	4.695	4.695
Observations	25810	24199	24199	23724	23548	19687
Panel C | Outcome: Trust in Parties						
Corruption Exposure Per Year $_{18\text{-}25}$	0.465***	0.528***	0.520***	0.221**	0.178*	0.187*
	(0.103)	(0.082)	(0.072)	(0.095)	(0.103)	(0.100)
Mean of the outcome	3.738	3.738	3.738	3.738	3.738	3.738
Observations	25842	24233	24233	23760	23587	19789
Panel D | Outcome: Trust in Politicians						
Corruption Exposure Per Year $_{18\text{-}25}$	0.586***	0.633***	0.636***	0.288***	0.246***	0.245***
	(0.076)	(0.066)	(0.058)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.076)
Mean of the outcome	3.754	3.754	3.754	3.754	3.754	3.754
Observations	26218	24590	24590	24113	23935	20098
Paired Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic and labour market cont.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Year	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Immigration Year	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Origin Country × Year	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
GDP Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Number of Origin Countries	196	196	196	196	196	196
Number of Host Countries	38	38	38	38	38	38

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. This table reports the results by regressing political trust variables on corruption exposure per year. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each panel displays the result of a different political trust variable. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure Per Year$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25 and then weighted by the length of stay in the home country. Paired country fixed effects are host country×origin country paired level fixed effects. Demographic and labour market controls include: age, a male dummy, employment status, and educational attainment (tertiary education, secondary education). Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 8: The Impact of Corruption Exposure (18-25) on Political Trust using Worldwide Governance Indicator Measures

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A | Outcome: Political Trust Index						
Corruption Exposure$^{WB}_{18-25}$	0.008	0.009	0.010	0.021*	0.022*	0.018
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Mean of the outcome	4.049	4.049	4.049	4.049	4.049	4.049
Observations	9190	8595	8584	8319	8123	8039
Panel B | Outcome: Trust in Parliament						
Corruption Exposure$^{WB}_{18-25}$	0.006	0.009	0.009	0.019*	0.017*	0.013
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Mean of the outcome	4.695	4.695	4.695	4.695	4.695	4.695
Observations	9563	8926	8915	8650	8451	8363
Panel C | Outcome: Trust in Parties						
Corruption Exposure$^{WB}_{18-25}$	0.009	0.009	0.010	0.020	0.022	0.016
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Mean of the outcome	3.738	3.738	3.738	3.738	3.738	3.738
Observations	9672	9031	9022	8754	8561	8474
Panel D | Outcome: Trust in Politicians						
Corruption Exposure$^{WB}_{18-25}$	0.011	0.010	0.011	0.025**	0.027**	0.026**
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Mean of the outcome	3.754	3.754	3.754	3.754	3.754	3.754
Observations	9831	9188	9178	8909	8720	8631
Paired Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic and labour market cont.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Year	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Immigration Year	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Origin Country × Year	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
GDP Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Number of Origin Countries	171	171	171	171	171	171
Number of Host Countries	38	38	38	38	38	38

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. This table reports the robustness results of using the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) corruption control data to construct corruption exposure measure. The corruption index is multiplied with -1 so that the higher value of the index represents a higher level of corruption. Each panel displays the result of a different political trust variable. The political trust is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure$^{WB}_{18-25}$corresponds to the average WGI Corruption control in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. Paired country fixed effects are host country×origin country paired level fixed effects. Demographic and labour market controls include: age, a male dummy, employment status, and educational attainment (tertiary education, secondary education). Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 9: Robustness to Controlling for Immigrant Network

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcomes ➔	Political Trust Index	Trust in Parliament	Trust in Parties	Trust in Politicians
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.055**	0.051*	0.063**	0.054*
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.030)
Migrant Network	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ × Migrant Network	0.058	0.078	0.009	0.043
	(0.039)	(0.075)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Observations	13378	13824	13910	14121

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each column displays the result of a different political trust variable. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. Migrant network refers to stock of migrants interacted with year fixed effects. The specification includes the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. See notes to Table 1. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey, OECD, and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 10: Robustness to Controlling for Household Income

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome ➔	Political Trust Index	Trust in Parliament	Trust in Parties	Trust in Politicians
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.053***	0.049**	0.045**	0.053***
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Income	0.062	0.102**	0.004	0.036
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.051)
Observations	22713	23548	23587	23935

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each column displays the result of a different political trust variable. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure18-25 corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. The specification includes the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. See notes to Table 1. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 11: Impact of Corruption Exposure (18-25) on Political Trust - Sub-components of the Corruption Index

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome ➔	Political Trust Index	Trust in Parliament	Trust in Parties	Trust in Politicians
Panel A | Executive Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.047***	0.039**	0.041**	0.049**
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Observations	22713	23548	23587	23935
Panel B | Judicial Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.007*	0.008*	0.008**	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	22713	23548	23587	23935
Panel C | Legislative Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.007	0.003	0.005	0.008**
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Observations	20757	21506	21575	21884
Panel D | Public Sector Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.048***	0.051***	0.042**	0.047**
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Observations	22713	23548	23587	23935
Paired Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic and labour market cont.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Immigration Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Origin Country × Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Origin Countries	196	196	196	196
Number of Host Countries	38	38	38	38

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. This table reports the results by estimating the baseline model specified in equation (2). Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each panel displays the result of a different sub-component of the corruption exposure variable. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Sub-components of the Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ measure correspond to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. Demographic and labour market controls include: age, a male dummy, employment status, and educational attainment (tertiary education, secondary education). Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 12: Robustness to Using Population and Sampling Weights

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome ➔	Political Trust Index	Trust in Parliament	Trust in Parties	Trust in Politicians
Panel A | Population Size Weight				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.053***	0.054**	0.037*	0.055**
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Observations	22583	23416	23455	23803
Panel B | Design Weight				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.050***	0.049**	0.039*	0.048**
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)
Observations	22583	23416	23455	23803

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each column displays the result of a different outcome variable. There are two different weights provided by the ESS: the population size (PWEIGHT) and design weights (DWEIGHT). Panel A reports the estimates from regressions weighted by the population size. Panel B shows the results from regressions weighted by the design weight. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. The specification includes the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. See notes to Table 1. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 13: Multiple Hypothesis Testing

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome ➔	Political Trust Index	Trust in Parliament	Trust in Parties	Trust in Politicians
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.055***	0.051***	0.045***	0.059***
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)
p-value	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
p-wyoung	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.01
Corruption Exposure$_{0\text{-}18}$	-0.001	0.000	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
p-value	0.88	1.00	0.67	0.78
p-wyoung	0.87	1.00	0.72	0.85
Observations	20295	21044	21098	21415

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each column displays the result of a different political trust variable. p-value reports the unadjusted p-values. P-wyoung reports the Westfall-Young stepdown adjusted p-values with bootstrapping 100 times. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Regressions include Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ and Corruption Exposure$_{0\text{-}18}$, where Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. Corruption Exposure$_{0\text{-}18}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 0 and 18. The specification includes the same set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. See notes to Table 1. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 14: Robustness to Excluding Influential Observations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome ➔	Political Trust Index	Trust in Parliament	Trust in Parties	Trust in Politicians
Panel A | Excluding Influential Observations at Top 5 Percentile				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.037**	0.032*	0.030*	0.040***
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Observations	24263	25164	25202	25572
Panel B | Excluding Host Countries with Fewer than 100 observations				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.039***	0.034*	0.031*	0.041***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Observations	24173	25070	25107	25475
Panel C | Excluding Host Countries with More than 1000 observations				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.045***	0.034*	0.038**	0.054***
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Observations	15651	16136	16146	16338
Panel D | Excluding Russia and other former Soviet Union countries				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.044**	0.040*	0.037**	0.045***
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Observations	19293	19961	20055	20350

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Estimates exclude observations with the corruption exposure in the top 5 percentile (Panel A), exclude host countries with extremely large and small numbers of immigrants (Panels B and C), exclude Russia and former Soviet Union countries (Panel D). Each column displays the result of a different political trust variable. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. The specification includes the same set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. See notes to Table 1. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 15: Immigrants from Less Corrupt Countries

Outcome ➔	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Political Trust Index	Trust in Parliament	Trust in Parties	Trust in Politicians
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.315*	0.331	0.279*	0.345**
	(0.155)	(0.196)	(0.155)	(0.156)
Observations	3652	3728	3801	3850

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. This table replicates the baseline model (specified in equation (2)) isolating the flows from less corrupt to more corrupt countries. The sample keeps only immigrants who migrate from less to more corrupt countries. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. The specification includes the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 16: Heterogeneity by Education

Sample ➔	(1) Tertiary Education	(2) Less than Tertiary Education
Panel A | Outcome: Political Trust Index		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.064**^{A}	0.028
	(0.031)	(0.021)
Observations	6793	14750
Panel B | Outcome: Trust in Parliament		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.046	0.026
	(0.033)	(0.025)
Observations	7005	15369
Panel C | Outcome: Trust in Parties		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.065*^{A}	0.018
	(0.037)	(0.021)
Observations	7061	15339
Panel D | Outcome: Trust in Politicians		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.060**^{A}	0.029
	(0.025)	(0.022)
Observations	7154	15629
Paired Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Demographic and labour market cont.	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Year	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Immigration Year	Yes	Yes
Origin Country × Year	Yes	Yes

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. This table reports the results by estimating the baseline model specified in equation (2) separately for respondents with tertiary education (column 1) and less than tertiary education (column 2). The superscript letter A means statistically significant difference (P < 0.05) between the tertiary educated vs. less than tertiary educated. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each panel displays the result of a different political trust variable. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. The specification includes the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. See notes to Table 1. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 17: The Impact of Corruption Exposure (18-25) on Natives' Political Trust

	(1)	(2)
Sample ➔	Natives	Natives excl. Second Generation Immigrants
Panel A | Outcome: Political Trust Index		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.025***	-0.050**
	(0.007)	(0.021)
Mean of the outcome	3.663	3.669
Observations	328635	300732
Panel B | Outcome: Trust in Parliament		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.026***	-0.042
	(0.008)	(0.025)
Mean of the outcome	4.228	4.234
Observations	333425	305124
Panel C | Outcome: Trust in Parties		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.025***	-0.062***
	(0.007)	(0.016)
Mean of the outcome	3.377	3.381
Observations	333536	305254
Panel D | Outcome: Trust in Politicians		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.025***	-0.043*
	(0.008)	(0.022)
Mean of the outcome	3.379	3.386
Observations	334984	306518

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***$p<0.001$. This table reports the results by estimating the baseline model specified in equation (2) for native sample (Column 1) and the native sample excludes second generation of immigrants (Column 2). Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each panel displays the result of a different political trust variable. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25, that is natives' own country corruption exposure. The specification includes the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. See notes to Table 1. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 18: The Impact of Corruption Exposure (18-25) on the Second-Generation Immigrants

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Sample ➔	Natives exclude Second generation	First Generation Immigrants	Second Generation Immigrants
Panel A | Outcome: Political Trust Index			
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.050**	0.053***	-0.037***
	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Mean of the outcome	3.669	4.049	3.597
Observations	300732	22713	27576
p-value of equality test		0.000	0.413
Panel B | Outcome: Trust in Parliament			
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.042	0.048**	-0.011
	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.014)
Mean of the outcome	4.234	4.695	4.160
Observations	305124	23548	27979
p-value of equality test		0.004	0.138
Panel C | Outcome: Trust in Parties			
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.062***	0.045**	-0.057***
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.014)
Mean of the outcome	3.381	3.738	3.336
Observations	305254	23587	27955
p-value of equality test		0.000	0.793
Panel D | Outcome: Trust in Politicians			
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.043*	0.053***	-0.042***
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Mean of the outcome	3.386	3.754	3.301
Observations	306518	23935	28138
p-value of equality test		0.001	0.960

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. This table reports the results by estimating the baseline model specified in equation (2) for native sample (Column 1), the first generation of immigrants (Column 2) and the second generation of immigrants (Column 3). Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each panel displays the result of a different political trust variable. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. The specification includes the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. See notes to Table 1. P-values of equality tests of coefficients in column 1 and column 2, column 1 and column 3 are provided. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. For natives and second generation of immigrants, we cluster at the origin country level. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 19: Non-Linear Effects of Corruption

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A | Outcome: Political Trust Index						
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.144**	0.144**	0.183***	0.089**	0.085*	0.118**
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.048)
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$^2	-0.011	-0.011	-0.017*	-0.009	-0.009	-0.012
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Observations	24909	24909	24909	24439	24263	20438
Panel B | Outcome: Trust in Parliament						
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.165***	0.165***	0.204***	0.096*	0.103*	0.124*
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.063)
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$^2	-0.015	-0.015	-0.021**	-0.011	-0.013	-0.015
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Observations	25810	25810	25810	25338	25164	21154
Panel C | Outcome: Trust in Parties						
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.120*	0.120*	0.151***	0.067	0.055	0.101*
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.052)
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$^2	-0.009	-0.009	-0.014	-0.006	-0.004	-0.011
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Observations	25842	25842	25842	25371	25202	21263
Panel D | Outcome: Trust in Politicians						
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.131***	0.131***	0.177***	0.081**	0.075**	0.087**
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.042)
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$^2	-0.008	-0.008	-0.015**	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Observations	26218	26218	26218	25745	25572	21587
Paired Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cohort Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic and labour market cont.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Year	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Immigration Year	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Origin Country × Year	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
GDP Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Number of Origin Countries	196	196	196	196	196	196
Number of Host Countries	38	38	38	38	38	38

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. This table shows the results of including both corruption exposure during impressionable years (Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$) and its squared term (Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$^2) as explanatory variables. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each panel displays the result for a different political trust variable. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. Demographic and labour market controls include: age, a male dummy, employment status, educational attainment (tertiary education, secondary education). Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 20: Exposure to Corruption and Trust in United Nations, Social Trust, and Non-political Attitudinal Variables

	(1)	(2)
Sample ➔	All Immigrants	European Immigrants Only
Panel A | Trust in United Nations		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.005	0.000
	(0.013)	(0.025)
Observations	23725	14707
Panel B | Social trust		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.023	0.035
	(0.014)	(0.031)
Observations	26738	16674
Panel C | People are fair		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.000	0.019
	(0.017)	(0.039)
Observations	26539	16549
Panel D | People try to be helpful		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.002	0.016
	(0.019)	(0.043)
Observations	26671	16626
Panel E | Important to understand different people		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.003	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.005)
Observations	25879	16189
Panel F | Important to help people and care for others well-being		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.005	0.011
	(0.006)	(0.010)
Observations	25903	16187
Panel G | Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people close		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.006	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	25897	16203
Panel H | Important to try new and different things in life		
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	-0.014*	-0.029*
	(0.007)	(0.015)
Observations	25883	16183

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***$p<0.001$. This table shows the estimated effect of corruption exposure on other attitude variables. Each panel displays the result of a different placebo outcome variable. Corruption Exposure18-25 corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. The specification includes the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. See notes to Table 1. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 21: Balance Test 1

	(1)
Outcome ➔	Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$
Population (log)	2.135
	(1.913)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.157
	(0.425)
National government revenue (log)	0.295
	(0.458)
Imports (log)	-0.119
	(0.335)
Exports (log)	-0.021
	(0.023)
National defense expenditure (log)	-0.179
	(0.261)
Percent GDP originating in industrial activity (log)	0.024
	(0.156)
Energy consumption in kg. per capita (log)	0.288
	(0.278)
The number of telephones per capita (log)	0.075
	(0.290)
Total school enrolment per capita (log)	0.653
	(0.926)
Physicians per capita (log)	0.350
	(0.330)
Host Country Fixed Effects	Yes
Origin Country Fixed Effects	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
Observations	16636

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. Ordinary least squares are estimated. Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. All explanatory variables are measured at the year of migration. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses.

Appendix Table 22: Balance Test 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Outcome ➔	GDP per capita (log)	National gov. revenue (log)	National defense exp. (log)	School enrol. per capita (log)	Physicians per capita (log)
Age at migration	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Single	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Secondary education	-0.002*	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Tertiary education	-0.000	-0.000	0.002	0.001**	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Christian	-0.002*	0.003	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Muslim	0.000	0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000**
Paired Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host Country × Immigration Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Origin Country × Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Origin Country × Immigration Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age × Origin Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age × Sub-national Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	13390	13390	13390	11921	9791

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. Ordinary least squares models are estimated. The specification includes a full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 1. All outcome variables measure and reflect the host country characteristics at the respondent's immigration year. See notes to Table 1. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Data Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Appendix Table 23: Balance Test 3

Age	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	-0.006	-0.002	-0.002	-0.005	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Tertiary	0.048***	0.005	0.005	0.035**	0.007	0.006
	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Secondary	0.014	0.004	0.005	0.002	0.005	0.006
	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Muslims	0.112*	0.033	0.036*	0.165*	0.034	0.036
	(0.061)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.087)	(0.028)	(0.025)
Christian	-0.023**	-0.002	-0.001	-0.027**	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ever had children	-0.005	-0.001	0.000	0.009	0.000	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Unemployed	0.028***	0.007***	0.005**	0.034***	0.007**	0.006**
	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Single				-0.037***	-0.004	-0.003
				(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Country × Year	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	210105	210092	209902	124840	124823	124716
R^2	0.011	0.848	0.887	0.016	0.858	0.885

Notes: This table shows the correlation between immigrant status and observable characteristics. The sample includes both immigrants and natives. Dependent variable is an indicator variable whether the individual is an immigrant (1) or native (0). We regress the immigrant status on a set of characteristics in age, gender, education, religion, parental status, unemployment status, and marital status.

Appendix Table 24: War-Driven Immigration at t-1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome ➔	Political Trust Index	Trust in Parliament	Trust in Parties	Trust in Politicians
Panel A | Migrants from Wars				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.087***	0.037**	0.101***	0.111***
	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.038)
Observations	6338	6634	6638	6757
Panel B | Migrants from Wars with Third Countries/Entities				
Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$	0.131***	0.061*	0.138***	0.190***
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.046)
Observations	3752	3937	3970	4039

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.001. This table restricts migrants to those migrating because of all types of wars (e.g., civil or international) in period t-1. War data is from the COW war database that records all wars when one state is threatened, displayed, or used force against another state. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation. Each panel displays the result of a different political trust variable. The political trust index is defined as the average of trust in parliament, parties, and politicians. Corruption Exposure$_{18\text{-}25}$ corresponds to the cumulative V-DEM Corruption Index in country of origin *o* when the individual *i* is between ages 18 and 25. Two-way clustered standard errors by host and origin country are in parentheses. Sources: European Social Survey and V-DEM.

Variable Definitions and Sources
This section provides an analytical overview of all the variables employed in the analysis.

Corruption and Institutional Quality Variables

Political Corruption Index: V-DEM conceptualizes and measures institutional corruption with a multidimensional approach: political corruption index, executive corruption index, and public sector corruption index. An index for each is based on several "coding points", incorporating a mixture of factual and evaluative indicators. The political corruption index incorporating six different dimensions of corruption that cover different areas and levels of the polity realm. These types of corruption are: corruption at legislative, corruption at judicial, public-sector bribery and embezzlement, executive bribery and embezzlement. Source: V-DEM.

Executive and Public Sector Corruption: They capture how routinely members of the executive (public sector employees) grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use. Source: V-DEM.

Legislative Corruption: Legislative corrupt index asks how often members of the legislative abuse their positions for financial gains including bribes, obtaining government contracts for firms that the legislators own, doing favors for firms in order to obtain the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislative, and stealing money from the state or from campaign donations. Index values range between 0 and 1 with higher values indicating higher levels of corruption. Source: V-DEM.

Judicial Corruption: This index asks how often individuals or businesses make undocumented payments or bribes to obtain a favorable judicial decision. The index is on a scale of 0-4, where "0" refers to always and "4" means never. Therefore, low values of the index represent high level of corruption. Source: V-DEM.

Electoral Democracy Exposure: This index asks to what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved. The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. The exposure measure is constructed in a similar way as our corruption exposure variable, i.e., for the range of years 18-25 using the same methodology. Source: V-DEM.

Participatory Democracy Exposure: This index asks to what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved. To make it a measure of participatory democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account. The exposure measure is constructed in a similar way as our corruption exposure variable, i.e., for the range of years 18-25 using the same methodology. Source: V-DEM.

Electoral Principle of Democracy: This comes from the additive polyarchy index in the V-DEM data, which asks to what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved. The index is operationalized by taking the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected executive, and suffrage. The weights are constructed so as to sum to 1 and weigh elected executive and suffrage half as

much as the other three, respectively. The exposure measure is constructed in a similar way as our corruption exposure variable, i.e., for the range of years 18-25 using the same methodology. Source: V-DEM.

Freedom Expression Exposure: This index asks to what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media censorship effort, harassment of journalists, media bias, media self-censorship, print/broadcast media critical, and print/broadcast media perspectives, freedom of discussion for men/women, and freedom of academic and cultural expression. The exposure measure is constructed in a similar way as our corruption exposure variable, i.e., for the range of years 18-25 using the same methodology. Source: V-DEM.

Clean Election Exposure: This index asks to what extent are elections free and fair? Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence. The exposure measure is constructed in a similar way as our corruption exposure variable, i.e., for the range of years 18-25 using the same methodology. Source: V-DEM.

Outcome Variables

Trust in Parliament: "Trust in Parliament" corresponds to the question "Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly [country]'s parliament?"

Trust in Politicians: "Trust in Politicians" corresponds to the question "Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly [country]'s politicians?"

Trust in Parties: "Trust in Political Parties" corresponds to the question "Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly [country]'s political parties?"

Political Trust Index: This index variable is calculated by taking the average of trust in parliament, trust in politicians, and trust in parties.

Trust in UN: This variable corresponds to the question "Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ...the European Parliament?"

People Trust: "People Trust" corresponds to the question "Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted."

People Fair: “People fair” corresponds to the question “Using this card, do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?”

People Help: “People help” corresponds to the question “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?”

Important to understand different people: This variable corresponds to the question “Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. It is important to her/him to listen to people who are different from her/him. Even when she/he disagrees with them, she/he still wants to understand them.”

Important to help people and care for others well-being: This variable corresponds to the question “Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. It's very important to her/him to help the people around her/him. She/he wants to care for their well-being”.

Important to try new and different things in life: This variable corresponds to the question “Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. She/he likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. She/he thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life.”

Individual Controls

Age: Age of the respondent.

Gender: Gender of the respondent.

Family Status: Family status is a binary variable taking the value 0 if the individual lives with a partner and 1 otherwise.

Employment Status: Employment status is a binary variable taking the value 0 if the individual is employed and 1 otherwise.

Level of Education: Highest level of education attained by the respondent. The questionnaire distinguishes seven different levels of education (less than lower secondary, lower secondary, lower tier upper secondary, upper tier upper secondary, advanced vocational, lower tertiary BA level, higher tertiary > MA level).

Household Income: The ESS survey measures household total income base on deciles of the actual household income range in the given country income measures the reported income of the immigrant. The median income is the reference point and the ESS calculates the 10 deciles using median itself at the top of the fifth decile (category F).

Media: The ESS survey includes variables about newspaper, TV, radio, and internet use. Newspaper is measured by news about politics and current affairs, watching, reading or listening, in minutes on average weekday. The variable corresponds to the question “On a typical day, about how much time do you spend watching, reading or listening to news about politics and current affairs?” Radio per week corresponds to the question “On an average

weekday, how much time, in total, do you spend listening to the radio?". TV per week is measured by TV watching on news, politics, and current affairs on average weekday. These variables are based on a scale from 0 to 7. "0" means "no time at all"; "1" means "less than 0.5 hour"; "2" means "0.5 hour to 1 hour"; "3" means "1-1.5 hours"; "4" means "1.5-2 hours"; "5" means "2-2.5 hours"; "6" means "2.5-3 hours"; "7" means "more than 3 hours". The variable of internet use corresponds to the question "Personal use of internet/e-mail/www". We code the variable to "0" if individuals never use or have no access at home or work. Otherwise, it equals to "1".

Migration network: We use the OECD international migration dataset that includes the migration stocks of foreign-borns of different nationalities in the year 2005. The migration network is calculated by the number of migrants per 1,000,000.

Other Aggregate Variables

GDP Exposure: Log GDP per capita comes from Penn World and denotes the average level of income per capita of the origin country for the period between 1950-2018. In the study, we calculate the exposure to GDP during impressionable years based on the date of the arrival of the immigrant in the origin institutions.

Assassination: Assassination is measured by the CNTS data. This variable measures any politically motivated or attempted murder of a high government official on politician.

Terrorism/Guerrilla Warfare: Terrorism variable is measured by any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime as reported in CNTS

Purges: Purge measures any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition. Source: CNTS data.

Riots: The riot variable in CNTS data measures any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.

Revolutions: Defined as any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government. Source: CNTS data.

Anti-government: Defined as any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for demonstrating the opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of anti-foreign nature. Source: CNTS data.

Exchange rate: The CNTS data on exchange rate gives the annual nation's official exchange rate that is local currency per U.S. dollar.

Population (log): Measured by the population density from the CNTS data.

National Government Revenue (log): National government revenue in the CNTS data is constructed by revenue to central government. Expressed in U.S. dollar equivalents.

Trade data: The CNTS data reports import and export data separately on a per capita basis.

Imports and exports are in logarithm.

National Defense Expenditure (log): Calculated from national government expenditure in the CNTS data.

Percent GDP originating in industrial activity (log): From CNTS. Industry activity includes mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and electricity, gas and water.

The number of telephones per capita (log): Calculated telephone entries including cellular per capita. Source: CNTS data.

Total school enrolment per capita (log): Primary and secondary enrolment per capita.

Physicians per capita (log): From CNTS.

Wars: War data is from the COW war database that records all wars when one state is threatened, displayed, or used force against another state.

Disasters: Disasters come from the database EM-DAT which records all the different types of natural disasters since 1900. Ordinary least squares models are estimated for ease of interpretation.

Political Behaviour Outcomes

Voted in the last national election: The voting variable is from the ESS survey that asks whether respondents voted in the last national election. The variable is coded as "0" if "not voting" and as "1" if "Yes". We exclude those not eligible for voting.

Worked in political party or action group in the last 12 months: The ESS survey includes the variable to ask whether respondents worked in political party or action group last 12 months. We coded the variable to be "0" if not and as "1" if "Yes".